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Introduction 
 
In the last four years, Argentina has seen both a liberalization of and 
tightening of monetary and fiscal policy as the economy itself has fluctuated. When 
Mauricio Macri assumed the presidency in 2015, he began liberalizing the economy 
and pursuing free market policies. However, over time the administration has been 
forced to turn back to old policies, reinstating currency and capital controls in an 
attempt to stabilize the economy “after the government failed to stem heavy 
investment outflows...to shore up its tumbling currency” (Hunnicutt, 2019). The 
case of Argentina, especially when compared with that of its neighbor Chile, 
highlights an interesting component of economic development debates: capital 
controls. This paper examines how capital controls affect growth and development 
in developing countries and emerging market economies, using the examples of 
Chile and Argentina as case studies. 
 Capital controls include those measures taken, typically by the government, 
to regulate the flow of foreign capital into and out of the country. They include 
taxes, tariffs, currency restrictions, bank regulations, and volume restrictions. These 
controls affect foreign exchange rates, inflation rates, assets, and the overall 
domestic environment for international investment and trade. Additionally, capital 
controls can be applied either to specific sectors or to the whole economy, and they 
can apply to different lengths of flows. Due to the abundance of literature focused 
specifically on the use of tariffs, this paper will not focus on tariffs. 
 In seeking to understand the role of capital controls in development, many 
scholars have looked to Chile, a country often hailed as a paragon of economic 
development and capital liberalization. It is striking that its neighbor, Argentina, is 
relatively similar and yet has failed to find an equal level of growth. As a result, 
Argentina and Chile make an interesting case study: the many similarities between 
them help control for endogeneity challenges in determining what accounts for the 
disparity in their economies. Both countries have similar military and political 
histories, with various military coups and nearly coinciding military juntas in the 
late 1900s. Both have a variety of terrain (including significant access to oceans), 
were colonized by Spain, and are among the most urbanized countries in the world 
(see Figure 1). They also passed laws for women’s suffrage in the late 1940s within 
two years of each other, which is significant given the general recognition of 
women’s rights as being influential in development (Coleman, 2004). The 
overarching historical and political similarities of the countries are highly important 
potential sources of endogeneity for which to control in order to more clearly 
identify the role of capital controls. With respect to capital controls themselves, 
both Chile and Argentina have had periods of capital control use and capital  
liberalization. However, they find themselves in different positions. Despite having 
a higher national GDP than Chile, Argentina’s GDP per capita is lower at $20,900  
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 Figure 1 
Urbanization Levels around the World (2018) 
 
Note. In light blue, both Chile and Argentina are among the most urbanized countries in 
the world. Adapted from World Urbanization Prospects: 2018 Revision, by United Nations 
Population Division, 2018 (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?t 
ype=shaded&view=map&year=2018). In the public domain.  
 
 
in 2017, as compared to Chile’s $24,600 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020a; 
Central Intelligence Agency, 2020b). Further, while Chile is generally the poster 
child of transition to market-based stability, Argentina is the poster child of 
economic crisis. 
 This paper examines the effects of the implementation and removal of 
capital controls on economic development, focusing first on economic growth and 
then considering effects on inequality. It introduces general perspectives on capital 
controls, analyzing their relationship with investment and growth, economic 
vulnerability, global integration, and corruption. Each analysis also demonstrates 
how these elements have evolved in Argentina and Chile. The essay then considers 
three additional debates about capital controls: it explains why scholars distinguish 
between types of capital flows, examines how inequality and capital controls are 
related, and discusses the role of international backing in the success or failure of 
capital liberalization. It finds that differences in these specific issues help determine 
the nuanced effects of capital controls. The paper then concludes that in developing 
countries—particularly those most similar to Chile and Argentina, such as other 
Latin American countries—removal of capital controls is often dangerous despite 
the fact that retention of capital controls slows growth and, by extension, economic 
recovery during crisis. Limiting capital control use to regulation of capital inflows 
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 can minimize the negative effects of capital controls until a country achieves 
enough stability and international backing to pursue capital liberalization. 
A potential challenge stems from the fact that “differences between the legal 
and actual degree of capital mobility [have] affected economists’ ability to measure 
the ‘true’ degree of financial integration of particular countries” (Edwards, 1999, 
p. 67). That is, evasion causes the degree of capital mobility to be larger than what 
legal restrictions suggest, making it challenging to accurately measure the effects 
of capital controls. However, this is not detrimental. Evasion can be expected to be 
a challenge for both Chile and Argentina, and in fact has been despite attempts by 
both countries to prevent it. This means that the challenge of evasion results in 
simple measurement error and that the conclusion reached applies not so much to 
capital controls as a theory, but rather to specific capital controls as they practically 
function. Additionally, controls that successfully eliminate evasion are likely to 
amplify any positive or negative effects found rather than alter them entirely.   
 
 
Effects of Capital Controls 
 
Overall, the discussion of the international implementation of capital 
controls has become more nuanced over time. Many recognize that capital controls 
are generally undesirable for economic growth, primarily due to their negative 
effects on investment, productivity, and trade. As a result, most countries have 
moved in the direction of capital and financial liberalization, with debate centered 
more on the timing and speed of this liberalization (Edwards, 1999; Obstfeld, 2009) 
rather than whether it should happen. Within this debate, however, there is a valid 
defense of the temporary retention of capital controls. 
Those in favor of capital controls argue that “in a world with imperfect 
information, free capital mobility is likely to amplify existing distortions, create 
situations of moral hazard, encourage excessive risk taking, and generate major and 
costly crises” (Edwards, 1999, p. 66). The removal of capital controls, therefore, 
can allow or even prompt behavior that worsens development problems and 
economic crises. This is particularly true in developing countries, where there is 
often a lower capacity to address moral hazard or negative market distortions. 
Developing countries also tend to be the countries most affected by the capital 
liberalization debate due to the desire for economic growth or recovery from 
economic crisis. While elimination of capital controls typically enables economic 
growth in industrialized countries with stable institutions, developing countries that 
lack stable institutions or are already in the midst of economic crisis can suffer from 
additional instability wrought by liberalization.  
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 On Investment, Growth, and Global Integration 
On the one hand, capital controls hinder economic growth through a variety 
of mechanisms, especially through their effect on a country’s foreign domestic 
investment (FDI), growth, and global integration. Because capital controls often 
directly restrict various types of foreign investment, they naturally decrease FDI. 
This can be problematic for achieving maximum growth given that FDI 
supplements domestic investment, which is particularly important when domestic 
investment is low (Arceneaux & Pion-Berlin, 2005). Other types of controls, like 
taxes and tariffs, change incentives and increase the costs of doing business with 
the country in question, thereby drawing labor and capital away and decreasing 
productivity and trade. Currency controls have a similar effect: currency 
restrictions often result in a high “black market premium [that] acts as a tax on 
exporters” (Easterly, 2002, p. 222), decreasing exports and driving down GDP. 
These decreases, especially in combination with other capital restrictions, limit 
trade participation and integration of the national economy into the global market. 
Elimination of capital controls, however, can facilitate integration into the 
worldwide financial system (Schiffrin, 2004), as is important in an increasingly 
globalized world. 
 However, research on the relationship between investment, economic 
growth, and elimination of capital controls is less conclusive than this theory 
suggests. Capital liberalization does not boost economic growth across the board, 
but rather only under specific conditions. Most capital controls, regardless of their 
specific form, focus on restricting capital flows in the form of investment to reduce 
the risk of volatility. One study analyzing cross-sectional data, panel data, and 
additional studies finds that “there is strikingly little convincing documentation of 
direct positive impacts of financial opening on the economic welfare levels or 
growth rates of developing countries” (Obstfeld, 2009, Abstract). Financial opening 
does promote increases in FDI. However, increases in FDI imply increased reliance 
on foreign nations’ capital and consequently greater financial vulnerability to 
volatile interests and decisions of those nations (Arceneaux & Pion-Berlin, 2005). 
In many industrialized countries, the national economy is able to absorb the 
volatility. In developing countries, however, economies and institutions are often 
too weak and unstable to do so. As a result, “the policy conclusion is generally that 
in order to reap the benefits from...integration, [capital liberalization] must be done 
within a healthy regulatory and supervisory framework” (De Gregorio, 2014, p. 
278). Without such a framework, the country becomes more vulnerable and less 
likely to experience improved growth rates or economic welfare.  
 
Investment, Growth, and Integration in Chile and Argentina 
Both Chile and Argentina began to pursue capital and financial 
liberalization in the 1970s. Chile liberalized around 1973, then reinstated capital 
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 controls from 1978 to 1982 and again from 1991-1998 (Maute, 2006). Argentina 
pursued liberalization during the same period, though it also reinstated some capital 
controls in the 1980s. The picture of growth is not a clear one. On the one hand, 
both Argentina and Chile experienced recessions, with Chile experiencing the 
deepest recession in the region in the 1970s (Frenkel, 2002). At first glance, this 
contradicts the theory that capital liberalization results in growth. However, the 
reinstitution of capital controls did not cure both countries’ economic woes either. 
Both Argentina and Chile reinstituted capital controls to aid economic recovery, 
yet the results have fluctuated significantly between booms and recessions and do 
not follow the same patterns within the two countries.  
Global integration offers both evidence of the differing fluctuations and an 
explanation for those fluctuations. Given the high level of international integration 
in Chile in 2010 (see Figure 2), the removal of capital controls does appear to have 
increased Chile’s global integration in a way that it did not in Argentina. However, 
Chile did still have capital controls in both 1980 and 1990, at which point it 
demonstrated an already-high level of financial integration. In fact, it had a higher 
level of international financial integration prior to capital liberalization than 
Argentina had after liberalizing. This suggests that a minimum level of 
international integration is a prerequisite for successful capital liberalization. It also 
coincides with the broader academic conclusion that “economies need a minimum 
 
 
Figure 2 
International Financial Integration in Latin American Countries 
 
Note. International financial integration measured as international assets plus liabilities, as 
a percentage of GDP. Adapted from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database, as cited in “Capital 
Flows and Capital Account Management,” by J. De Gregorio, 2014, in What Have We 
Learned: Macroeconomic Policy after the Crisis, edited by G. Akerlof, O. Blanchard, D. 
Romer, and J. Stiglitz, p. 281. Copyright 2014 by International Monetary Fund and 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
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 level of governance, institutional development, quality of macroeconomic policies, 
and other characteristics to be able to absorb capital flows without detrimental 
effects on growth” (De Gregorio, 2014, p. 279). Capital liberalization is indeed 
economically beneficial, but only under specific conditions. Argentina, with its 
lower levels of global investment and integration, did not have those conditions. 
 
On Economic Vulnerability 
The importance of these “conditions” is again demonstrated in the 
relationship between capital controls and economic vulnerability. Most economists 
“now generally agree that rapid liberalization of capital markets can be dangerous 
for developing countries unless they have a stable macroeconomy, strong banking 
sectors, and developed ways of overseeing the financial sector” (Schiffrin, 2004, p. 
60). Without these requirements, markets are ill-equipped to respond to 
international economic instabilities. As a result, if a country has weaker institutions 
and a less reliable macroeconomic framework—as is the case in many emerging 
market economies—then retaining capital controls can help minimize vulnerability 
to fluctuations in the international market. 
The economy’s vulnerability to changes in the value of the U.S. dollar 
demonstrates how this would work. Figure 3 reflects how dollar appreciations lead 
to declines in GDP in  emerging market economies. Opening financial markets too 
quickly makes countries highly vulnerable to unforeseeable shifts in capital flows  
 
 
Figure 3 
U.S. Dollar and Emerging Market Economies’ GDP and Investment Cycles 
 
 
Note. In emerging market economies, dollar appreciations coincide with falls in GDP and 
investment. Adapted from The Dollar and Emerging Market Economies: Financial 
Vulnerabilities Meet the International Trade System (International Finance Discussion 
Papers No. 1258), by S. Shousa, 2019, p. 2 (https://doi.org/10.17016/IFDP.2019.1258).  
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 and exchange rate volatility (Schiffrin, 2004; Kanas, 2001). The effects of such 
vulnerability are reflected by the dashed red lines in Figure 3. Dollar appreciations 
coincide with falls in GDP and investment. Capital controls (especially controls on 
the exchange rate) can help insulate the economy from such effects by flattening 
the dashed line, protecting against falls in GDP and investment but also detracting 
from the peaks.  
Proponents of capital liberalization point out that the “increased integration 
into international supply chains” typically implied in capital liberalization also 
“leads trade flows to be less sensitive to exchange rate movements” (Shousa, 2019, 
p. 3), decreasing economic vulnerability without capital controls. However, the 
differences in the levels of integration of Argentina and Chile noted in Figure 1 
demonstrate that integration does not automatically result from liberalization. A 
country that liberalizes before having some minimum level of international 
integration exposes its financial vulnerabilities without the protection offered by 
integration into international supply chains. In this case, the shocks of dollar 
appreciations or changes in capital flows can outweigh the benefits of the volatile 
incipient stages of capital liberalization and integration. Given all of this, it is 
prudent for countries lacking strong institutions and a minimum level of 
international integration (though “strong” and “minimum level” are difficult to 
define concretely) to retain capital controls in order to protect themselves from 
further economic vulnerability, despite potential loss of growth. 
 
Heightened Economic Vulnerability in Argentina 
 In discussing how removal of capital controls exposes an economy to 
further vulnerability, Argentina’s recent experience is particularly pertinent. Since 
Mauricio Macri’s pursuit of liberalization in 2015, the country has had the painful 
experience of watching its currency depreciate against the U.S. dollar as the 
currency adjusts to the market rate. The average Argentine citizen has, as a result, 
been living with the typical day-to-day challenges of high inflation, including full 
exposure to daily changes in the exchange rate. In the 24 hours following the 2019 
primary election results that placed Alberto Fernández above Mauricio Macri, 
many international investors withdrew their investments in Argentina from fear of 
Fernández placing strict controls and limitations on foreign business operations in 
an already economically challenging country. As a result, the Argentine peso lost 
another 25% of its value against the U.S. dollar in a single day (Meredith, 2019). 
Adapting to such a drop proves difficult for all parties, whether individual citizens 
or large businesses. Had capital controls limited international investment from the 
start, the total investment and consequent withdrawal and depreciation would not 
have been as large. However, had the country not been in an economic crisis, 
international investors might not have withdrawn as much, or the economy might 
have been more capable of handling the withdrawal. Argentina demonstrates how 
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 capital liberalization increases economic vulnerability to international fluctuations. 
The conditions surrounding liberalization, such as whether the country is already 
in crisis or has strong institutions, determine whether that economic vulnerability 
is too great to be absorbed.  
 
On Corruption and Institutional Capacity 
Capital controls also provide an opening for increased corruption, especially 
when a country lacks strong institutions (as is common in developing countries). In 
this case, capital controls are rendered both corrupt and ineffective. 
Simply put, capital controls create the opportunity for corruption (Edwards, 
1999; Maute, 2006; Schiffrin, 2004). Where there are more rules in place, there are 
more opportunities for corruption. Currency controls, for instance, can create a high 
black market premium by driving up the perceived value of U.S. dollars and 
intensifying competition for licenses to buy U.S. dollars (Easterly, 2002). As 
restrictions and competition increase, the payoffs for helping others evade the 
restrictions also increase, producing greater incentives to participate in the black 
market economy. At its best, high participation in the black market economy simply 
detracts from growth in the legal economy. At its worst, black market participation 
fosters an environment of corruption in which public officials have increasingly 
high incentives to profit through corrupt acts, such as accepting bribes from those 
seeking to obtain U.S. dollars.  
Institutional corruption, in turn, weakens institutional strength. A country 
with high levels of corruption is naturally more likely to have funds misdirected or 
“skimmed off the top,” to perpetuate inequality between those who can afford to 
pay bribes and those who cannot, and to pursue programs and policies that benefit 
a small niche rather than the general population. It is difficult to quantify the 
strength of a country’s institutions for comparison against corruption levels. 
However, a potential symptom of lack of institutional capacity is the failure to meet 
societal desires for improved health, education, and living standards. The Human 
Development Index uses these very measurements to rank countries by their level 
of “human development.” A higher Human Development Index score indicates 
higher levels of across-the-board health, educational, and living standards, while a 
higher Corruption Perception Index score indicates less corruption. Figure 4 plots 
these two scores against each other, resulting in a clear positive correlation. That 
is, on average countries with higher perceptions of corruption have correspondingly 
low scores in the Human Development Index.1 There is likely to be a similar 
 
1 Using data provided by Transparency International (2018) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (2019), a regression controlling for differences between countries and 
time-specific errors finds the relationship to be statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Again, this 
says nothing about causality, and it is not surprising that these measures would be correlated. The 
regression simply confirms that the two are indeed closely correlated. 
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 correlation between higher perceptions of corruption and lower institutional 
capacities. These results are, of course, far from definitive, based on averages, and 
say nothing of causality. However, they provide a basis for continued exploration 
of the relationship between corruption and institutions. 
Irrespective of whether corruption actively worsens institutional capacity, 
institutional strength itself is an important element of the capital control debate. A 
major criticism of capital controls is that they are hard to enforce (Schiffrin, 2004). 
A country already lacking sound institutions and mechanisms for enforcing rule of 
law in general—as is the case for most developing countries—is unlikely to enforce 
capital controls to a sufficient degree to reap their expected benefits. Broadly 
speaking, the usefulness of capital controls comes down to whether  potential 
stabilization is significant enough to offset the other challenges that worsen as a 
result. 
 
  
Figure 4 
Human Development Index vs. Corruption Perception Index 
 
  
Note. Higher levels of corruption appear to be positively correlated with lower levels of 
“human development,” as defined by the Human Corruption Index. Adapted from 
Corruption Perceptions Index, by Transparency International, 2018, 
(https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi) and from Human Development Data, by 
United Nations Development Programme, 2019, (http://hdr.undp.org/en/data) using 
Gapminder Tools (https://www.gapminder.org/tools/). In the public domain.  
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 Institutional Corruption in Argentina and Chile 
 Argentina’s experiences with both capital restrictions and capital 
liberalization demonstrate many of the negative effects of each. In the years 
following the Great Depression of the 1920s, Argentina began following more of a 
closed economy (i.e. capital control-friendly) strategy, but in addition to hindering 
economic efficiency and growth, this strategy produced corruption (Maute, 2006). 
Liberalization over the course of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, however, has not 
necessarily fixed that corruption.  
 From 2003 through 2015, either Cristina Kirchner or her husband, Nestor 
Kirchner, held the Argentine presidency. As center-left Peronists, the two reinstated 
various controls and policies that resulted in “rampant corruption during their 
combined mandates” (Vargas Llosa, 2010, as cited in Manzetti, 2014, p. 176). 
However, since the 1990s Argentina has had both center-right and center-left 
presidents, and “in both cases, corruption has tended to go unchecked due to 
insufficient government accountability” (Manzetti, p. 173). To an extent, 
corruption has simply become a part of Argentina’s political system, as is the case 
in many other Latin American countries. As a result, it is difficult to determine how 
much of the perceived corruption under the Kirchner regimes was a continuation of 
prior corruption, and how much resulted from their policies and capital controls. 
Problems with capital controls have arisen under Macri as well, although in terms 
of general enforcement and institutional weakness rather than corruption of 
officials. A news article from Clarín Digital explains that in the beginning of 2019, 
many Argentines found ways to get around the limits on how many dollars they 
could purchase each month (Bazzan, 2019). As expected, capital controls proved 
difficult to enforce. 
 Chile’s capital controls did not foster as much blatant corruption but did 
lead to greater institutional weakness. After relaxing controls for a few years, Chile 
restricted inflows again in 1991. As in Argentina, the private sector found many 
ways around these controls, such as misstating the purpose of funds. Though the 
Chilean government responded by extending coverage of controls to include trade 
credits and FDI loans, large firms with international connections and access to 
finance had “the connections and ability to reconfigure their assets in a way that 
[circumvented] controls” (Edwards, 1999, p. 72). The prevalence of circumvention 
demonstrates the general weakness of the institutions in the face of capital controls. 
 
 
Further Capital Control Debates 
 
 Having examined the ways in which capital controls affect a country’s 
development, it is important to consider additional debates that inform why 
countries experience the effects in different proportions. The distinction between 
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 capital outflows and inflows is vital, as a country’s choice to focus on controlling 
one or the other often determines the success of capital controls as a tool for 
stabilization. Additionally, debates over the trade-off between open capital markets 
and inequality touch on social justice questions that must be addressed. Lastly, a 
country’s international backing is found to be another determinant of the success of 
capital control policies. 
 
Capital Outflows and Inflows 
Some scholars argue that contrary to theory, capital controls do not detract 
from growth. One study concludes that “after controlling for other variables, capital 
restrictions have no significant effects on macroeconomic performance” (Rodrik, 
1998, as cited in Edwards, 1999, p. 68). If this is true, then the benefits of capital 
liberalization are largely eliminated, and the apparent trade-off between stability 
and growth disappears. However, Edwards suggests that Rodrik’s conclusion is 
based on IMF indexes that fail to distinguish two things: first, the intensity of 
various levels of capital restrictions; and second, the type of flow that the controls 
restrict. This criticism introduces a crucial distinction between capital outflows and 
capital inflows. 
Current research suggests that restrictions on capital outflows affect the 
economy differently than restrictions on capital inflows. These two types of capital 
flows are, essentially, what they sound like. Capital outflows refer to capital or 
assets leaving an economy, while capital inflows refer to capital entering an 
economy. Increasing foreign investment in the domestic economy, for example, 
increases capital inflows. Identifying which flows are targeted by a country’s 
policies helps scholars determine the true extent of those policies’ effectiveness. 
In general, controls on outflows prove to be ineffective in slowing down or 
preventing crisis. Such controls generally include some combination of taxes on 
funds remitted abroad, dual exchange rates, prohibitions on the transfer of funds, 
or withdrawal limits at banks. During the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico increased their controls on capital outflows and “still 
experienced a long and painful decline in growth, high inflation and protracted 
unemployment” (Edwards, 1999, p. 70). Their experiences contradicted arguments 
that capital controls give a country room to recover. In fact, in roughly 70 percent 
of cases in which controls on outflows were used to prevent capital flight, there was 
instead a significant increase in capital flight (Edwards). By signaling fear of crisis 
to the international community, controls backfired. They hastened the economic 
crisis while, as noted previously, encouraging corruption or exacerbating 
institutional weakness.  
Inflows, on the other hand, are prone to instability (hence the desire to 
control them) but also contain foreign direct investment, “the most important and 
stable component of inflows in Latin America” (De Gregorio, 2014, p. 275). 
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 Controls on inflows enable countries to “change the composition of flows or reduce 
some specific inflows, such as excessive…short-term banking flows. In this case, 
the control would be serving a financial stability purpose” (De Gregorio, p. 282). 
De Gregorio points to Asia during the global financial crisis of 2007-08 as proof 
that volatility in inflows worsens crises. In Asia, he argues, inflows were made up 
more of banking debt flows, which are more volatile. As a result, the crisis in Asia 
in 2008 was more severe than in Latin America, where capital inflows were 
composed of proportionally fewer banking debt flows. Controlling the composition 
of inflows, therefore, can minimize volatility and thereby help minimize crisis. 
 
Controlling Outflows in Argentina, Inflows in Chile 
In the Argentina-Chile comparison, both countries have had episodic capital 
controls over time. However, Argentina’s controls often restricted capital outflows, 
while Chile’s controls focused on controlling inflows. This difference is a crucial 
component of why Chile’s controls have generally been more successful in 
promoting economic growth. 
In Argentina, capital controls were imposed on both outflows and inflows 
prior to the 1970s. However, the Latin American debt crisis of the 1970s and 1980s 
were a formidable obstacle to Argentina’s liberalization and reform process. In 
response to the crisis, the country reinstated a fixed exchange rate while continuing 
to eliminate trade barriers. Though macroeconomic performance initially 
improved, it did not last due to high exposure to volatility in short-term 
international capital flows (Stanley, 2018). A series of global financial crises in the 
1990s further decreased capital inflows into Argentina and, by extension, drove 
down national GDP (Stanley, 2018). Argentina again began tightening controls by 
prohibiting foreign currency transactions (controlling outflows) and imposing 
minimum stay requirements (controlling inflows). As before, the economy initially 
appeared to recover, but it did not stabilize long-term. Capital controls have since 
been implemented and removed repeatedly within a continually volatile market. 
While capital controls might have provided a short-term bandage, they have not 
provided a foundation for long-term stability and growth in Argentina. 
Chile, on the other hand, has focused primarily on taxes and regulations 
concerning the stay requirements for capital flowing into the country and has 
generally enjoyed positive economic growth and corresponding improvements in 
various measures of well-being. Edwards (1999) summarizes the argument in favor 
of Chile’s capital controls as follows: “By discouraging short-term capital, while 
still attracting longer-term funds, Chile’s controls have helped the country achieve 
a remarkable record of growth and stability” (p. 71). Chile did so by changing 
reserve requirements and interest rates for inflows to prohibit or discourage shorter-
term flows while encouraging longer-term flows. In 1978, Chile prohibited inflows 
with maturities below 24 months and subjected inflows with maturities between 24 
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 and 66 months to a 10-25% reserve requirement (Edwards). In 1991, Chile 
subjected all inflows to a 20% reserve requirement (Edwards). This system 
essentially functioned as a tax on capital inflows under which a longer stay in the 
country resulted in a lower implicit tax rate. The private sector did find ways of 
evading the controls. Even so, Chile did manage to change the composition of 
capital inflows. Figure 5 reflects this change, as short-term flows made up 90.3% 
of gross capital inflows the year before capital controls were implemented and only 
2.8% the year before controls were removed. One of Argentina’s challenges had 
been high vulnerability to changes in inflows, as short-term inflows could be 
removed from the country during crisis and worsen its economic situation. Chile, 
however, minmized reliance on such volatile inflows. This difference helps explain 
why capital controls facilitated economic stability in Chile but have not had the 
same effect in Argentina. 
 
Capital Liberalization and Inequality 
One aspect of the argument in favor of capital controls has not yet been addressed: 
their effect on inequality. Some scholars criticize capital liberalization and open 
markets in general as mechanisms that increase the gap between the rich and poor. 
One study by Furceri and Loungani (2015) found that on average, there is indeed a 
positive relationship between capital mobility and inequality. This relationship 
suggests that decreasing capital mobility through capital controls should also  
 
 
Figure 5 
Capital Inflow Composition in Chile During Capital Control Use 
 
Note. Gross foreign capital flowing into Chile, measured in millions of U.S. dollars. Short-
term flows are those with a stay of less than one year. Adapted from “How Effective are 
Capital Controls?” by S. Edwards, 1999, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(4), p. 74. 
Copyright 1999 by American Economic Association. 
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 decrease inequality, which leads to the question of whether growth should be 
sacrificed in the name of equality. Another study by Andres Bergh and Therese 
Nilsson (2010) compared “freedom to trade internationally” with inequality and 
also found them to be robustly and positively related. Policy makers could therefore 
argue that removal of capital controls in pursuit of growth is “wrong.” However, 
the finding is more nuanced than it initially appears: “Reforms toward economic 
freedom seem to increase inequality mainly in rich countries, and social 
globalization is more important in less developed countries. Monetary reforms, 
legal reforms, and political globalization do not increase inequality” (Bergh & 
Nilsson, Abstract). This suggests that the ways and realms in which liberalization 
is pursued play a role in determining whether inequality increases. Similarly, other 
studies find that although capital mobility and inequality are positively correlated, 
there is little evidence for a causal link between international openness and 
increasing inequality (Odedokun, 2001; Fauser, 2014). This implies that capital 
liberalization need not come at the expense of equality and social justice ideals. In 
light of the 2019 protests in Chile over inequality, this is an appropriate issue to 
consider.  
 César Calderón and Alberto Chong (2001) examine the sources of income 
inequality using panel data. The study finds that the previous period’s Gini 
coefficient, schooling, the real exchange rate, and the black market premium are 
significant determinants of inequality in the current period. Past inequality in 
particular is highly statistically significant (Calderón & Chong). On the one hand, 
this is no surprise. It is nearly impossible for a country to experience a sudden, 
massive change in inequality over the course of one period. On the other hand, it 
means that a country with historically high inequality has greater barriers to 
overcome in achieving lower levels of inequality, regardless of policy decisions.  
Additionally, Calderón and Chong (2001) find that there is a negative 
significant relationship between the intensity of capital controls and income 
inequality. That is, looser controls predict an increase in income inequality. This 
coincides with the studies by Furceri and Loungani (2015) and Bergh and Nilsson 
(2010). However, this relationship is substantively small, implying that the 
presence or lack of capital controls only explains a fraction of inequality. This 
suggests that equitable growth is not inherently incompatible with capital 
liberalization. Instead, inequality depends on the presence of strong, trustworthy 
institutions that properly redistribute growth. 
 
Inequality in Argentina and Chile 
There are few studies on the causes of inequality in Argentina, but most 
focus on social mobility or political power. That said, wage inequality is observed 
to have greatly increased during the 1990s, part of the period associated with 
Argentina’s neoliberal reform and trade liberalization process. As a result, it is easy 
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 to blame that rising inequality on capital liberalization. However, one study 
analyzing the relationship between trade liberalization and wage inequality in 
Argentina finds that if trade liberalization does indeed lead to a rise in wage 
inequality, it can only explain a small part of any observed rise (Galiani & 
Sanguinetti). That is, capital liberalization cannot take all the blame for increasing 
inequality. This finding echoes the study by Calderón and Chong (2001). 
Any attempt to explain contemporary Chilean protests over inequality and 
economic injustice is limited, as the protests are still ongoing as of March 2020. 
The protests broke out in 2019, a year in which the Gini coefficient was the lowest 
yet since 1990. Figure 6 depicts the steady decrease in the Gini coefficient over the 
last two decades (though it is undoubtedly still high). Inequality has been 
improving, so it is interesting that the protests broke out in 2019 and not earlier, 
when inequality was higher. An opinion article published on the Cato Institute’s 
website gives an interesting (though not proven) analysis of why this may be:  
 
Growth experienced a significant slowdown during the previous 
government, and Piñera has not reversed anti-growth policies introduced by 
his predecessor…The resulting stagnant wages combined with greater 
government spending and taxation without a corresponding improvement 
in the quality of public services [emphasis added] has contributed to 
Chileans’ malaise. So have the corruption scandals that erupted during the 
previous government. (Vásquez, 2019, Causes of Discontent section) 
 
 
Figure 6 
Gini Coefficient for Chile (1987–2019) 
 
Note. The Gini coefficient in Chile has been steadily decreasing since 1990. Adapted from 
“Gini Index (World Bank Estimate)—Chile,” by the Development Research Group, 2019 
(https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=CL). In the public domain.  
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 Like the studies by Bergh and Nilsson (2010) and Calderón and Chong (2001), this 
theory argues that capital liberalization (as pursued in Chile since roughly 2001) 
does not in itself lead to a massive rise in inequality. Instead, it is failure of 
governmental institutions to redistribute increases in growth in an equitable way 
that leads to the public outcry against inequality and economic injustice. Of course, 
this theory is not definitive and does not prove that capital controls have no role in 
decreasing inequality. It merely demonstrates that the relationship is complicated 
and that arguments for retaining capital controls to prevent inequality and economic 
injustice should be examined further and examined rigorously. 
 
The Role of International Backing 
In addition to differentiation between capital inflows and outflows, a 
potential explanation for country-to-country differences in the effects of capital 
reform is the role of international backing. Craig Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin 
(2005) explain that in general, successful neoliberal reform (including removal of 
capital controls) “relies on backing from the outside.” This backing is dependent 
on “the divergent motivations of these three actors—business, government, and 
[international financial institutions]” (pp. 44-45). In an ideal world, this would 
result in foreign investment and trade flowing between the countries that, for 
example, protect human rights or demonstrate the least corruption. Such ideals, 
however, do not always hold up to reality.  
In pursuing neoliberal reform, Latin American political leaders “must open 
a route of international influence if neoliberal reform is to succeed, but who travels 
on that route is largely out of their hands” (Arceneaux & Pion-Berlin, 2005, p. 43). 
This means leaders must expose themselves to all of the vulnerability associated 
with neoliberal reform and capital liberalization while having little control over the 
process once they have transitioned away from capital controls. Whether or not 
their decision pays off is largely in the hands of the rest of the world as the world 
decides how to interact with the opened country. The aforementioned “three actors” 
with their “divergent motivations” complicate the picture. Governments, for 
example, might choose to engage with strategic countries that are closed-off 
economically, while the IMF seeks out countries pursuing economic reform. The 
two actors have diverging motivations. As a result, there is no easy set of rules to 
follow in order to receive international backing by all three actors. 
The influential presence of these actors in various combinations ensures “a 
steady stream of foreign influence…as well as unique combinations of outside 
involvement from country to country” (Arceneaux & Pion-Berlin, 2005, p. 44). In 
the previous hypothetical example, the closed-off strategic country would be 
influenced by a foreign government with little IMF presence, while the open 
country would experience the opposite. In some cases, a country might have a 
strong presence of two actors but be lacking the third entirely. In their study, 
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 Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin compare the cases of Argentina and Chile, as 
considered now.  
 
The Competition for International Backing: Argentina vs. Chile 
 In the late 1970s both Argentina and Chile began a process of pursuing 
general neoliberal reform. Their paths, however, have diverged. Argentina is 
perpetually in crisis while Chile is seen as a model of economic success. Arceneaux 
and Pion-Berlin (2005) argue that the divergence stems from differences in 
international support: “Argentina, lacking the market opportunities of Brazil and 
political unity of Chile, finds itself in an unfortunate position. Despite considerable 
showings of neoliberal concurrence, international support for the country falls 
behind the levels secured by its neighbors” (p. 47). In the 1990s, Argentina was 
generally more compliant with neoliberal reform requirements and liberalized more 
quickly. The “general reform index” in Figure 7 lists each country’s average of five 
scores that quantify markers of neoliberal reform. Chile’s general reform score is 
lower than Argentina’s primarily due to its capital liberalization score in Figure 8. 
The lower score reflects the retention of some capital controls, which is no surprise 
given that these measurements were taken in the middle of Chile’s second period 
of capital control implementation (1991-98). Notably, despite Argentina’s higher 
reform scores, it is Chile that receives support from all three actors involved in 
international backing rather than Argentina. Therefore, pursuit of economic 
principles and reform is not the final determinant of international backing.  
 
 
Figure 7 
General Reform Index (1995) 
 
Note. Adapted from Indices of Structural Reform in Latin America, by S. A. Morley, R. 
Machado, and S. Pettinato, 1999, as cited in “Neoliberal Reform in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile,” by C. Arceneaux, and D. Pion-Berlin, 2005, in Transforming Latin America: The 
International and Domestic Origins of Change, p. 54 (https://doi.org/ 
10.2307/j.ctt9qh5d7.6/). Copyright 2005 by University of Pittsburgh Press.  
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 Figure 8 
Structural Reform Categories and Scores (1995) 
 
Note. Overall rankings noted in parentheses. Argentina has, on average, a higher ranking 
than Chile. Adapted from Prospects for Free Trade in the Americas, by J. Schott, as cited 
in “Neoliberal Reform in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,” by C. Arceneaux, and D. Pion-
Berlin, 2005, in Transforming Latin America: The International and Domestic Origins of 
Change, p. 54 (https://doi.org/ 10.2307/j.ctt9qh5d7.6/). Copyright 2005 by University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
 
 
The ongoing poor economic performance of Argentina relative to Chile 
reflects this lack of support. At the end of the 1990s, the IMF was the main actor 
supporting Argentina; however, “because international support hinges on the 
conduct of all three parties, the IMF could only  
postpone (and may have even intensified) an economic crisis in Argentina” 
(Arceneaux & Pion-Berlin, 2005, p. 47). This lack of support appears relatively 
arbitrary, as Argentina could have done little more to “earn” support. Simply put, 
the U.S. and other powerful actors were (and often continue to be) relatively 
indifferent to Argentina. 
 This does not mean, however, that a country’s policy decisions are futile. In 
their paper, Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin (2005) conclude that “without international 
support, the prospects for success decline considerably” (p. 83). The prospects 
worsen, but success is not out of the question. If another study, for example, found 
that democracy increases a country’s prospects for gains in civil liberties, it is still 
possible for a democracy to experience an erosion of civil liberties. Democracy 
merely worsens an aspiring dictator’s prospects of restricting citizens’ freedoms. 
The same thought process applies to international backing and successful reform: 
lack of international support does not make successful capital liberalization 
impossible; it simply constitutes an additional obstacle to face. 
Additionally, the study by Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin (2005) is concerned 
with the success of overall neoliberal reform (hence the measurements in four 
categories in addition to capital liberalization). Had Argentina limited its capital 
controls to controls on inflows, Argentina might have had a capital reform score 
closer to that of Chile and had greater overall economic success despite the lack of 
international backing. More cautious reforms that retained capital controls on 
18
Submission to Global Tides
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides
 inflows might have at least minimized or slowed some elements of Argentina’s 
economic crisis.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The former section suggests that Chile’s restrictions on capital inflows 
followed by eventual capital liberalization were not successful solely because of 
the policy decision itself. Rather, removing capital controls improved economic 
growth in Chile because Chile had international backing, but removal worsened 
economic crisis in Argentina because Argentina lacked that backing. The presence 
of international support, therefore, amplifies the benefits of removing capital 
controls, while the lack of international support amplifies the dangers. As a result, 
the benefits and dangers of removing capital controls must be considered in light 
of classic economic concerns in addition to the question of international backing. 
In all, although capital account liberalization should generally be pursued in order 
to further economic growth, it should be done cautiously, under specific conditions 
of institutional strength and with considerations of the international environment. 
Until those conditions are met, retention of capital controls provides a level of 
stability and insulation for emerging economies, especially when using controls on 
capital inflows rather than outflows to minimize volatility and maximize any 
potential for growth.  
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